Outlooks

Contemporary research and evaluations of existing policy initiatives in the field of Romani studies reveal that cultural racism against Roma remains widespread in the Nordics today. An emphasis on ‘cultural difference’ is so endemic that it can make officials and decision makers blind to alternative reasons for exclusion, such as class and structural antigypsyism. Despite some evidence to suggest modest success with the Swedish “bridge builder programme", research and evaluations are often highly critical, suggesting that it may in fact support exclusory practices. This echoes our research and hands-on experience with teaching Romani students and collaborating with Roman civil society in Sweden. Meanwhile, other crucial steps for building trust, such as a permanent Roma agency, go unrealised.

Gender equality is a fundamental part of the Nordic brand, and right-wing political actors as well as extremists use ideas of gender equality in support of anti-immigrant and racist agendas. The pop culture image of Viking women as ‘independent’ and ‘equal to men’ provides one way in which gender equality as an aspect of Nordicness has gained historical legitimacy. New research continues to demonstrate the varied roles that women had in the past and historical media are required to be “authentic” whilst really telling the kinds of stories people want to see.

The real or imagined cultural history of the Nordic countries (taken individually, in small groups or in their entirety) is a useful tool not to be disregarded lightly. The assets of Nordicity can be seen from varying perspectives, including the anthropological, ideological and the political. But the path of Nordic culture needs to be trodden with care: At its worst, it can provide succour for anti-democratic forces and uncertainty in a time when the security of the nation state is highly valued. At its best, it can provide a useful alternative to the national or European level, as a historically-rooted asset that adjusts to new interpretations and uses.

The 'use of history' is the term used to denote a combination of selecting, emphasising and overlooking people, events and epochs taken from history. These aspects are to be found in the pool of historical knowledge that we share and are usually identified with the intention of promoting certain interests. In the Nordics, as elsewhere, these interests are usually either to do with politics, providing information or entertainment, or have something to do with identity.

Scandinavian “socialism” has been oddly absent from the final stages of the recent US election. It is possible to trace the arguments for and against ‘Scandinavian’ policies of different kinds in the American left and right from the 2016 election campaign until recently. However, the “socialism” that both the American right and left previously thought they saw in Scandinavia is no longer as unequivocal after the challenges of the coronavirus and the new fault lines of a meandering election campaign.

The Nordic region is frequently presented in the American media as prosperous and business-friendly, as well as allowing for extensive welfare benefits. US media coverage often positions one or more of the Nordic countries between the monolithic and highly politicized understandings of ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism’ – with the many shades of mixed economies that coexist within the Western liberal and democratic sphere unacknowledged. In this way, the Nordic countries often function in the American political imaginary as blank screens upon which politicians and pundits project justifications for their own version of American economic policy—either for or against a social welfare state. The resulting images of the Nordics in the US reveal less about the complexities of the region itself, and more about current American national anxieties and the enduring legacy of the Cold War upon American self-definitions.

The prevailing economic doctrine in the Nordics and Europe has it that, the lower the public debt, the more room there is for economic stimulation in downturns, such as the current covid-19 crisis. Denmark, Norway and Sweden with their comparatively low levels of public debt were able to announce relatively large economic crisis packages fairly quickly. Finland has a high level of public debt and is generally less economically flexible due to it being part of the eurozone. Despite the pressure to keep public debt down, the Nordics would do well not to sacrifice important public spending.

A look back at how Sweden and Finland dealt with two key crises in the twentieth century may be enlightening during the current Corona crisis. Firstly, the depression in 1930s, which led to Keynesian interventionalism - with some key differences - brought with it a series of steps throughout the following decades in both countries. Secondly, the global oil crisis in 1970s, when the two countries embraced an approach which heavily steered their national economies into becoming guarantors of smooth-functioning capitalism. While their responses were similar to other western democracies, certain aspects were divergent. There are similarities between the economic policies leading up to 1930s and the post-Bretton Woods capitalism that has lasted since 1970s. The current corona crisis may provide an opportunity for political elites in the Nordics as elsewhere to choose similar paths to back then, namely, either a Keynesian-type of countermovement to free market capitalism, or inward-looking xenophobic nationalism.

Given the striking similarity of the Nordic societies, it is interesting to note how differently some of them have reacted to the current covid-19 crisis. For example, Denmark and Norway were quick to implement a work and school lockdown and close their borders. In contrast, Sweden has raised international interest with a comparatively lax approach to enforcing social distancing by legal measures. Irrespective of which approach is ‘correct’, the diverse reactions have disclosed the different ways each country is run, particularly with respect to the relationship between government and administrative authorities, such as, health boards, as well as to the concerns over the fragility of the democratic system as a whole. These differences are often rooted in historical traditions and experiences. Here, Johan Strang, Associate Professor at the Centre for Nordic Studies at the University of Helsinki, considers some of the reasons for these differences.

The “Nordic model” is often presented as a solution to the dominance of neoliberalism and the rise of populism. Populist tendencies within the region, including the reclaiming of nationalist identities and anti-immigration and anti-globalisation sentiment, can often be overlooked by outside observers. Whereas elsewhere economic crises encourage states to bow to market forces at the expense of democracy, the Nordics are seen as having been relatively unscathed by economic downturns. However, economic vulnerability is also felt by sections of the population in the Nordic countries who are subsequently more likely to turn to populism. Attempts to revitalise trust in political institutions e.g. citizen initiatives, are often piecemeal and insufficient. Democracy is not a ‘fate’ even for the Nordic countries; on the contrary, it is a tortuous path, the outcome of which can never be taken for granted.